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rational relation test because objective criteria existed that could have
been easily utilized to make a more accurate determination of residen-
cy 68
Thus the meaning of Salfi is twofold. First, in the area of Social
Security, the individual interest affected, even when there is a total
deprivation of benefits, will be insufficient to trigger conclusive pre-
sumption analysis. This will be particularly true when the rule has a
prophylactic effect, insulating the system from substantial abuse, since
the governmental interest will be correspondingly great. Secondly, the
Court may find a given classification to be rationally related to the
legislative goal in spite of a fairly close examination of the statute. The
factor crucial to such a finding is the unavailability of other methods
that would clearly yield a more accurate result. Other means were not
proven to be available in Salfi; the statute was therefore validated as a
legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. To deprive Congress of the
power to enact statutes, albeit admittedly imperfect, to protect public
welfare systems from abuse when other effective means are unavailable
would be, indeed, to quote from an earlier opinion of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, "an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself.""0
WILLIAM H. HIGGINS
Constitutional Law-The First Amendment Status of Commer-
cial Advertising
In the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,1 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution does not prohibit regulation
of "purely commercial advertising."' Although the statement was not
the basis for the Court's decision in that case, it spawned the widely
accepted doctrine3 that "commercial speech" is not protected by the first
68. Such criteria included voter registration, driver's license, car registration, prop-
erty ownership, place of filing tax returns, and year-round homes. Id. at 448.
69. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. Id. at 54.
3. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384-85 (1973); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (dissent); Breard v.
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amendment. A broad exception to this "commercial speech" doctrine
developed over the years which gave first amendment protection to
commercial speech if the commercial aspect of the speech was subordi-
nate to a "primary purpose" of religious freedom or political advoca-
vy.4  In Bigelow v. Virginia' the Supreme Court disposed of the
"commercial speech" doctrine completely without overruling Valentine
and then applied a standard that gives commercial speech first amend-
ment protection if it contains "factual material of clear public interest."6
In Bigelow the advertisement in question, which previously would have
been denied first amendment protection on the ground that it was
"commercial speech," was afforded first amendment protection on the
basis of its informational content. This result seems to indicate a
greater willingness on the part of the Court to give first amendment
protection to advertisements. The Court, however, shied away from
holding that commercial speech per se is protected by the first amend-
ment and thus evidenced a further desire to subject advertising's potent
message-selling powers to some degree of local governmental regula-
tion.7
Appellant Bigelow was the managing editor of The Virginia Week-
ly, a newspaper that is published and circulated in Virginia.8  The
Virginia Weekly published a New York-based abortion-referral agency's
advertisement which stated that abortions were legal in New York, that
there were no residency requirements for abortion patients and that
immediate placements in accredited hospitals would be made with full
confidentiality for those who called the New York telephone numbers
listed.0 Bigelow was convicted by the County Court of Albemarle
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597 (1942); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582,
584 (D.D.C. 1971); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va.
1969) (three-judge court); Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz.
231, 240, 375 P.2d 719, 725 (1962); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11
N.J. 144, 152, 93 A.2d 362, 366 (1952).
4. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
5. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
6. Id. at 822.
7. For a discussion of the problems of advertising, see Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
8. The Virginia Weekly is published by the Virginia Weekly Associates of
Charlottesville. The appellant was convicted because he was the responsible officer of
thepaper. 421 U.S. at 811.
9. The advertisement in full ran as follows:
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County for publishing the abortion-referral advertisement under section
18.1-63 of the Virginia Code Annotated which at that time provided1°
that anyone who encouraged or prompted the procural of abortion by
publication, advertisement or "in any other manner" would be guilty of
a misdemeanor.1 He was afforded a trial de novo in the Circuit Court,
wherein he was again convicted and also fined. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed. 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States vacated the holding and remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of the recently decided abortion cases of Roe v. Wade 3 and
Doe v. Bolton.'4  On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court again af-
firmed 5 and the case went back to the United States Supreme Court on
appeal. The Supreme Court finally reversed Bigelow's conviction 0 on
the ground that the advertisement contained "factual material of clear
... public interest' 7 and thus was protected by the first amendment.
The rationale of the Bigelow decision is best understood in light of
the line of cases out of which it grew. In Valentine v. Chrestensen the
"UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN
ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND




New York, N.Y. 10022
or call anytime
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We
will make all arrangements for you
and help you with information and
counselling."
Id. at 812.
10. The statute was amended by ch. 725, [1972] Va. Acts. In its opinion, the
United States Supreme Court said that "the amended statute would not reach appellant's
advertisement." 421 U.S. 813 n.3. Therefore, the constitutionality of the statute was
not at issue in Bigelow.
11. The statute before amendment read:
"If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation
of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of
abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63
(1950).
12. 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). For a discussion of the opinion, see
Recent Developments, The First Amendment and Commercial Advertising: Bigelow v.
Commonwealth, 60 VA. L REv. 154 (1974).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
15. 214 Va. 341,200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
16. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Justices Rehnquist and White dissented).
17. Id. at 822.
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appellant had attempted to distribute a handbill advertisement in viola-
tion of a section of the New York City Sanitary Code which forbade the
distribution of advertisements on public streets. Upon being told by the
Police Commissioner that he could only lawfully distribute handbills
devoted to "information or a public protest,"' 8 Chrestensen appended a
"civic appeal" to the handbill, solely "with the intent, and for the
purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance."'' Because of
Chrestensen's attempt to evade the handbill law, the Court refused to
consider his first amendment claim. Therefore the Court never reached
the issue whether commercial speech is protected by the first amend-
ment. In its opinion the Court acknowledged that the first amendment
prohibits legislatures from unduly burdening the right of free speech but
followed by saying: "We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing."12 0 This statement eventually came to be known as the "commer-
cial speech" doctrine and has often been cited as authority for the
contention that commercial speech does not fall within the protective
embrace of the first amendment. 2'
A series of cases followed Valentine which involved speech that
combined either commercial and religious aspects or commercial and
political aspects. In deciding these cases, the Court looked to see which
aspect was "primary." Most notable among these cases were the
religious handbill cases, in which a religious organization engaged in
door-to-door distribution of advertisements for religious meetings,'22 sold
religious books and pamphlets for a nominal sum"3 or distributed
circulars which invited people to buy religious books or contribute to the
religious organization. '  Similar were the political advocacy cases, in
which a labor union leader advocated the union's cause to a mass of
workers and then solicited new members 2 or a political-organization
lawyer solicited clients to test issues in the courts. 2a The Supreme Court
held that the speech in these cases fell outside of the "commercial
speech" doctrine and inside the protection of the first amendment
because the "primary purpose" of the speech was either religious or
18. 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942).
19. Id. at 55.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Cases cited note 3 supra.
22. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
23. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
24. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
25. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
26. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
1976]
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political and the commercial aspect was merely incidental to that pur-
pose. The implication of this "primary purpose" test was that speech
that did have commerce as its "primary purpose" would fall squarely
within the Valentine label of "purely commercial advertising" and there-
fore outside the protections afforded by the first amendment.
The Court turned away from the "primary purpose" test in the
1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.27 The respondent in
that case claimed that a paid political advertisement in The New York
Times was libelous and sued The Times for printing it. The Times
claimed that it had a first amendment privilege to accept and print the
advertisement. Although the advertisement clearly had political advo-
cacy as its primary purpose and therefore would have received first
amendment protection under the "primary purpose" test, the Court no
longer looked to the "primary purpose" of the advertisement. Rather,
the Court shifted its focus to the informational content of the advertise-
ment and found that it "communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial sup-
port on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters
of the highest public interest and concern. Purely on the basis of the
content of the advertisement, the Court found it to be deserving of first
amendment protection.
The Supreme Court contrasted Sullivan to Valentine in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights. 20  In that case
the Court was presented with the question whether the first amend-
ment gives a newspaper editor the right to publish advertisements in sex-
designated columns in contravention of a local ordinance. Sullivan was
distinguished from Valentine on the ground that the Valentine advertise-
ment did no more than propose a commercial transaction, whereas the
Sullivan advertisement communicated information as well.30 The Court
in Pittsburgh Press ultimately found that the advertisements in question
merely proposed commercial transactions and were therefore within the
"commercial speech" exception to the first amendment proscription.'
The "commercial speech" doctrine was not without critics during
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. Id. at 266.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id. It is important to note, however, that an uncontested ordinance in
Pittsburgh Press made discrimination in employment illegal. Since the Court reasoned
that it would violate public policy to allow advertising of illegal commercial activities, it
is questionable whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion if an illegal
activity had not been involved. ld. at 388.
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this period. Three Justices dissented from the holding of Pittsburgh
Press.32 Furthermore, in his concurring opinion in Cammarano v. United
States,3 3 Justice Douglas discussed the state of the "commercial speech"
doctrine: "The [Valentine] ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it
has not survived reflection." '34 "The extent to which such advertising
could be regulated consistently with the First Amendment . . . has
* * . never been authoritatively determined."35 Thus, the "commercial
speech" doctrine was overripe for review when Bigelow v. Virginia was
appealed to the Supreme Court.
In Bigelow the Supreme Court reevaluated both Valentine and the
"commercial speech" doctrine. First, the Court limited the holding of
Valentine to apply only to the "manner in which commercial advertising
could be distributed" 36 and not to commercial advertising per se. Thus,
according to the Bigelow Court, Valentine holds that the means of
distributing advertising may be regulated, but does not speak to the
issue of whether commercial advertising itself may be regulated. There-
fore, Valentine is not authority for the "commercial speech" doctrine.
The Court then expressly rejected the "commercial speech" doctrine in
favor of the more modem approach adopted in Sullivan and Pittsburgh
Press: commercial speech "is not stripped of first amendment protection
merely because it appears in that form."' 7
The real questions presented in Bigelow, however, were how much
protection the first amendment affords commercial speech and under
what conditions. To answer those questions, the Court developed a
content test to be applied on a case-by-case basis to commercial adver-
tisements. If the advertisement in question contains "factual material of
clear public interest"3 it will be afforded first amendment protection.
This test was implicit in Sullivan, which protected the advertisement
there in question because it contained "matters of the highest public
interest and concern. 39  In Bigelow the Court adopted the Sullivan
standard as part of its informational content test.
This abstract informational content test acquired concrete meaning
32. In separate dissents, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart
rejected the "commercial speech" doctrine and disapproved of the majority's decision as
an unwarranted extension of that doctrine. Id. at 393, 397, 400.
33. 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
34. Id. at 514.
35. Id. at 513 n.*.
36. 421 U.S. at 819.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 822.
39. 376 U.S. at 266.
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when the Court applied it to the Bigelow advertisement. In applying
the test, the Court "[v]iewed [the advertisement] in its entirety"40 and
found that it "conveyed information of potential interest and value to a
diverse audience ... ." The Court particularly stressed the first two
lines of the advertisement: "Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements." Also, the Court pointed out that
the mere existence of abortion-referral agencies is a matter of public
interest, as are abortions themselves.42 Thus, the Court was willing to
look, not only to the content of the body of the advertisement, but also
to the subjects of public interest suggested by the advertisement.
Furthermore, the Bigelow advertisement lacked one important
characteristic that was previously essential to a finding that an advertise-
ment was protected by the first amendment: it did not contain an
expression of religious freedom or any political grievance or advocacy. 41
Rather, the Bigelow advertisement had as its "primary purpose" the
solicitation of a commercial transaction and any information "of public
interest" contained in the advertisement was merely incidental to that
purpose. By giving first amendment protection to the Bigelow adver-
tisement, the Court indicated that application of the informational con-
tent test will result in giving commercial advertisements much more first
amendment protection than has been true in the past.
By subjecting commercial advertising to a content test, however,
the Supreme Court preserved the historical distinction between commer-
cial and other forms of speech. Bigelow requires that commercial
speech be scrutinized with regard to content, whereas, with respect to
other forms of speech, the Court "has always refused to distinguish for
first amendment purposes on the basis of content. '44 This inquiry into
the content of advertising leaves a big governmental foot in the door of
first amendment protection of advertising. Although the courts may no
longer reject a first amendment claim out of hand because an advertise-
ment is the subject of the claim, they are still free to reject the claim on a
case-by-case basis by finding that the content of the advertisement in
question does not meet the Bigelow test.
40. 95 S. Ct. at 822.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
44. 421 U.S. at 831 (dissent). Of course, there are exceptional cases in which
the Court will consider content: if the content of the speech is found to be obscene
(Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957)), libelous (Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)), or "fighting" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)), then it is stripped of first amendment protection. Normally, however,
content has no relevance to the question of whether speech is protected.
[Vol. 54
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Furthermore, the protection afforded an advertisement that meets
the Bigelow content test is not absolute. The Court applied a balancing
test to the competing interests at stake in Bigelow. When, as in
Bigelow, the interest of an individual or a group of individuals conflicts
with a state interest, the Court must balance the respective interests
against each other to determine which will take precedence. When first
amendment interests are involved, the Court has traditionally accorded
them great weight in this balancing process.45 When the private interest
is in the realm of commerce, however, the Court has traditionally given
that interest less weight, with the result that state regulation of commer-
cial activity has been upheld far more readily than state regulation of
first amendment interests. Since the Court gave the Bigelow advertise-
ment first amendment protection, it would appear that advertising is
now weighted equally with other forms of speech protected by the first
amendment. The Court, however, was not at all clear on the issue.
Rather than emphasizing the importance of the first amendment interest
involved, the Court denigrated the state interest: "Virginia [was] really
asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read
about the New York Services. . . . This asserted interest . . . was
entitled to little, if any weight under the circumstances."46  There is
reason to believe that the Bigelow Court did not value the interests of
advertising as highly as it has valued other first amendment interests.
The Bigelow Court sanctioned the result of Valentine, wherein the state
interest prevailed over the interests of advertising. The Valentine ordi-
nance, prohibiting distribution of commercial handbills in the public
streets, was found to be "a reasonable regulation" of advertising.
47
Similar ordinances pertaining to non-commercial handbills have not
been sanctioned by the Court. For example, Schneider v. State48
involved a similar ordinance which forbade the distribution, not just of
commercial handbills, but of all handbills, in the public streets. In that
case, the Court found that such a prohibition restrained free speech and
therefore was an entirely unreasonable regulation. Likewise, an ordi-
nance forbidding the distribution of anonymous handbills in the public
streets was struck down as an unlawful restraint on free speech in Talley
v. California.49 The balancing standard applied to conmnercial adver-
45. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448 (1963) (dissent); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 527 n.12 (1945).
46. 421 U.S. at 828.
47. Id. at 819.
48. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
49. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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tisements in Valentine and accepted by the Court in Bigelow is clearly
less stringent than that applied in Schneider and Talley, when non-
commercial speech was involved.
It remains to be seen what types of advertising will be subject to
governmental regulation after Bigelow. Of course, any advertisement
that does not meet the requirement of the threshold informational
content test may be regulated. Assuming, however, that the threshold is
met, it will be important to know what types of advertising will balance
unfavorably against the state's interest, resulting in state regulation of
speech. The Bigelow Court indicated its approval of regulation of
advertising in the areas of electronic media communication 0 and profes-
sional activities, 51 and it described another area in which it thought there
"existed a clear relationship between the advertising in question and an
activity that the government was legitimately regulating."5 2  In this
area, advertising which violated United States Postal Regulations,"
racially discriminatory advertising54 and advertising which violated anti-
block-busting laws55 were prohibited. The Court further implied that
regulation of deceptive or fraudulent advertising, advertising of illegal
activities and advertising aimed at a captive audience will be subject to
regulation. 56
Bigelow's most important contribution to the constitutional prob-
lem of commercial advertising is its rejection of the "commercial
speech" doctrine. Courts may no longer deny first amendment protec-
tion to advertisements merely because they are commercial in character.
Instead, the courts must undergo a two-step process with respect to each
advertisement brought before them: first, the courts must test the con-
tent of the advertisement to determine whether it contains "factual
material of clear public interest." Secondly, if the advertisement passes
this content test, then the courts must balance the competing interests
involved before granting or denying first amendment protection. The
50. Electronic media is an area in which advertisements have been greatly regulat-
ed. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
51. Particularly in the field of medical health, the Court has often held that the
state may regulate advertising. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424 (1963):
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
52. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.
53. Rockville Reminder, Inc. v. United States Potal Serv., 480 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1973).
54. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
55. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972).
56. 421 U.S. at 828.
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Bigelow Court indicated, however, that the fulcrum used in balanc-
ing governmental interests against those of advertising will favor the
government so that most of the regulation of advertising which was
sanctioned before Bigelow will remain intact. If this proves true in the
courts' post-Bigelow case-by-case considerations of advertisements, then
the first amendment status of advertising will not be any higher after
Bigelow than it was before. It appears that the rule allowing govern-
mental regulation of advertising will remain in force and that advertise-
ments receiving first amendment protection, such as the one involved in
Bigelow, will remain the exception to the rule.
HELEN L. WINSLOW
Criminal Law-Testing the Credibility of Search Warrant Affi-
davits
Relying upon the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution', criminal defendants often attempt to suppress evidence being
offered against them by attacking the validity of the search warrant used
to obtain the evidence.' One method of challenging the warrant's
validity is by attacking the affidavit upon which its issuance was based.3
1. State court defendants actually rely on the fourth amendment as incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). References to the fourth amendment in this note are made
with this incorporation in mind.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The United States Supreme Court has held that most searches may be made only
with a search warrant, the situation involved in this note. Warrantless searches have
been permitted only when officers come across evidence in "plain view," as in Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam); when the search is consented to;
where there are exigent circumstances, such as the possibility that evidence will be
destroyed or moved, as in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); or subsequent
to lawful arrest, as in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
When a search has been made with a warrant, possible issues are whether there was
probable cause for the warrant, whether the warrant was issued in accord with statutory
requirements, and whether it was executed properly.
3. Former section 15-26(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes required that
"(a]n affidavit signed under oath or affirmation by the affiant or affiants and indicating
the basis for the finding of probable cause must be a part of or attached to the warrant,"
